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A POLICY ANALYSIS OF A SUCCESSOR
CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR ITS
PREDECESSOR'S DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
WHEN THE SUCCESSOR HAS ACQUIRED
THE PREDECESSOR'S ASSETS FOR CASH
The issue of whether a successor corporation may be held liable for inju-
ries caused by a defective product sold by its predecessor corporation gener-
ally has been decided by applying traditional corporate law which focuses
on the type of corporate acquisition between the predecessor and succes-
sor.1 If the acquisition is through a cash purchase of the predecessor's as-
sets, rather than through a merger, consolidation, or stock purchase, the
traditional corporate law holds that the successor is not liable for any liabil-
ities of the predecessor.2 However, this traditional corporate law is subject
to four exceptions where the successor is held liable for its predecessor's
defective products.'
The traditional corporate law presents an obstacle for the products lia-
bility plaintiff seeking compensation for his or her injuries. A plaintiff
might have no recovery if the predecessor corporation has dissolved and the
statutory abatement period has passed, unless the plaintiff may recover
from the successor corporation.4
Many courts realize that this tension exists between corporate law and
products liability plaintiffs. Some courts have created new rules to enable
the plaintiff to recover, either by expanding the traditional law5 or by creat-
ing new rules.6 However, the justifications given for these new rules are not
fully analyzed by those courts.
This Comment begins with the background of traditional corporate law
as related to the issue of the successor's assumption of its predecessor's lia-
bilities. Part II gives a short introduction to the policies behind strict liabil-
ity. Next, Part III discusses the holdings of several courts that have tried to
alter the traditional corporate law in order to satisfy products liability law.
Wisconsin's stance in this area is briefly mentioned. Part IV analyzes the
strict products liability rationales used to justify successor liability. Part V
concludes this Comment with an analysis of the strict products liability ra-
1. See infra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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tionales as applied to the various theories of successor liability. Finally, it is
recommended that courts adopt either the "duty to warn theory" or the
"bona fide purchaser solution" when presented with an issue of successor
liability.
I. CORPORATE LAW AND ITS EFFECT ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CLAIMS
A. The Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Creditor's Claims
A corporation's capacity to be sued under common law ended when the
corporation legally dissolved.7 Today, jurisdictions have abatement statutes
which cause a corporation to exist for a definite time period after dissolu-
tion for certain purposes, including the purpose of being sued.' However,
these statutes do not have provisions for contingent claims based on the
possibility of being injured from defective products of the dissolved corpo-
ration.9 Hence, if the corporation dissolves and the statutory abatement
period passes, all subsequent creditors' claims are generally barred.
If a corporation dissolves, the disposition of the corporate assets deter-
mines the potential success of a products liability plaintiff. If the corpora-
tion dissolves by distributing its assets among its shareholders, no claim
may be brought after the statutory abatement period has expired." ° How-
ever, if another corporation "acquires control" of the dissolved corpora-
tion's assets, then depending upon the type of acquisition between the two
corporations, the products liability plaintiff might be able to bring suit
against the successor.1
7. 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS sec. 8113
(rev. perm. ed. 1979).
8. 15 Id. at sec. 8166; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, sec. 278 (1983); REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT sec. 14.07(c) (1984); Wis. STAT. sec. 180.787 (1985-86).
It has been said that because of these abatement statutes, the complete dissolution of a corpo-
ration does not take place until the end of the dissolution period. Abercrombie v. United Light &
Power Co., 7 F. Supp. 530, 542 (D. Md. 1934).
The corporation might exist even past the abatement period if litigation commenced prior to
the expiration of that period is still alive, although new suits cannot be commenced after the
statutory period. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, sec. 278 (1983).
9. Walach, Products Liability; A Remedy in Search of a Defendant - The Effect of a Sale of
Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 325
(1976).
10. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 41 n.9
(1975).
11. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text; See generally Yamin, The Achilles Heel of
the Takeover: Nature and Scope of Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions,
7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 185, 212-14 (1984).
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B. Types of Corporate Acquisition and Its Effect on Successor Liability
There are three major types of corporate acquisition: (1) statutory
merger or consolidation; (2) purchase of the acquired corporation's stock;
and (3) cash purchase of the acquired corporation's assets.12 The effect of
corporate acquisition depends upon which type of acquisition is used.
A statutory merger or consolidation is an acquisition which satisfies the
requirements of the state's applicable merger or consolidation statutes. If
the corporate acquisition is by statutory merger or consolidation,1 3 it usu-
ally results in the surviving corporation assuming the liabilities of the
predecessors. 1 4
If the corporate acquisition is through the purchase of the acquired cor-
poration's stock, the acquiring corporation does not "directly" assume the
liabilities of the acquired corporation.15 However, this does not present a
problem to the products liability plaintiff because the acquired corporation
is actually a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation, and as a subsidiary it
has its own separate legal identity which can be sued.16 Thus, the sale of
the predecessor's stock has no real effect on a plaintiff's ability to sue the
acquired corporation.
If the corporate acquisition is through a cash purchase of the acquired
corporation's assets, the general rule is that the successor corporation does
not assume the present or contingent liabilities that belong to the selling
12. See generally B. Fox & E. Fox, 13A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS secs. 23.01-23.04 (1986);
Yamin, supra note 11, at 213-14.
13. A merger occurs when one corporation absorbs another. The absorbing corporation re-
tains its name and corporate identity, with the addition of the absorbed corporation's capital,
franchises, and powers. The absorbed corporation ceases to exist. See 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS sec. 7041; Wis. STAT. secs. 180.67(1) &
(2) (1985-86).
14. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at secs. 7118, 7121; see, e.g., Wis. STAT. sec. 180.67(5)
(1985-86) ("Such surviving or new corporation [shall be] liable for all the liabilities and obliga-
tions of each of the corporations so merged or consolidated .... "); see also REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT sec. 11.06 (1984). As to the effect in Delaware and New York, see A.
HOFFMAN, ISRAELS ON CORPORATE PRACTICE sec. 13.19 (4th ed. 1983).
It has been said that surviving or consolidating corporations are "heirs" to the liabilities that
would have belonged to the merged or consolidated corporations. C. SCHARF, ACQUISITIONS,
MERGERS, SALES AND TAKEOVERS 3, 4 (1971).
15. Yamin, supra note 11, at 213-14. However, there is an indirect assumption because the
acquired corporation is still existing and still is subject to liability. Hence, the acquiring corpora-
tion is indirectly liable up to the extent of its investment in the acquired corporation.
16. Id. at 214.
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corporation. 17  This type of transaction is the primary focus of this
Comment.
C. Exceptions to the Rule of Nonassumption of Liabilities
There are four well-recognized exceptions18 to the rule of nonassump-
tion of liabilities when a successor corporation purchases the assets of an-
other corporation: (1) when the acquiring corporation expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume the selling corporation's liability; (2) when the
transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability for such obliga-
tions; (3) when the transaction amounts to a merger or a consolidation of
the purchaser and seller corporations (a "de facto" merger); or (4) when the
purchaser corporation is merely a continuation of the seller corporation.
The first exception, an express or implied agreement to assume the lia-
bilities, is fairly straightforward. Often, whether a court finds an express or
implied assumption of liabilities depends upon the interpretation of the
purchase agreement between the predecessor and the successor.19 If the
language concerning the liabilities assumed by the successor in the purchase
agreement is vague, unclear, or too broad, courts find an implied assump-
tion of liability for defective products.2" In order to be certain that the
successor has not made an implied assumption of all liabilities, it is best if
the written agreement explicitly states that there is no assumption of future
products liability.21
17. For a complete collection of cases invoking this rule, see 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13,
at sec. 7122 n.l.
Recent cases which have involved this general rule include Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 204, 460 N.E.2d 895 (1984); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d
258, 692 P.2d 787 (1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985).
This rule also applies to once-removed corporate successors. See generally Goucher v.
Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. App. 1984); Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 258, 692 P.2d 787.
18. For a full citation list of cases applying individual exceptions, see Note, Torts - Products
Liability - Successor Corporation Strictly Liable for Defective Products Manufactured by the Pred-
ecessor Corporation, 27 VILL. L. REV. 411, 413-15 (1982).
19. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at secs. 7112, 7114-15, 7124.
20. See Yamin, supra note 11, at 213-14; Note, supra note 18, at 413-15; see, e.g., Bouton v.
Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970) (broad liability language in agreement);
Bippus v. Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (unclear liability language in
agreement).
21. Agreeing to assume liabilities incurred in the "normal course of business" has been held
as an assumption of future products liability. See, e.g., Bouton, 423 F.2d at 652; Bippus, 437 F.
Supp. at 106; McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, -, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970),
aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972). But see Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145,
1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (stated in dicta that specific language excluding the assumption of tort
liabilities by the successor did not bind third parties with product liability suits, rather, it only
allowed the successor the right to seek indemnification from the seller).
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The second exception, a fraudulent transaction, is also straightforward.
Fraudulent transactions are generally found when there is inadequate con-
sideration.22 A transaction is also found fraudulent if the consideration is
paid directly to the predecessor's shareholder, or if the successor knows of
the predecessor's intent to default on its corporate debts.23 However, the
fraudulent transaction exception is usually not successfully invoked by
products liability plaintiffs.24
The third exception to the general rule of nonassumption of liability in
asset-for-cash sales, the de facto merger, produces the same automatic as-
sumption of liabilities as a statutory merger,2 5 even though the transaction
purports only to be a sale and the formal statutory requirements have not
been met.2 6 The elements of a de facto merger were set out by a federal
district court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Company.27 In summary,
these elements are:
(1) continuity of shareholders or ownership resulting from the use
of the successor's stock as payment, rather than the use of
cash;28
22. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at sec. 7125; see, e.g., Enos v. Picacho Gold Mining Co.,
56 Cal. App. 2d 765, 133 P.2d 663 (1943); Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 434, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971); Avery v. Safeway Cab, Transfer & Storage Co., 148 Kan.
321, 80 P.2d 1099 (1938). But see McKee, 109 N.J. Super. at _, 264 A.2d at 58-59 (inadequate
consideration is a separate and distinct exception to the general rule).
23. Note, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Products
Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 351 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (valuable
consideration and no trace of fraud); Reina v. Gingerale Corp., 472 So. 2d 530 (Fla. App. 1985)
(allegations insufficient to support a finding of fraud).
25. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26. See, eg., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp. 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (W.D.
Mich. 1974); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251-52 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Schwartz v.
McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780-81, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783-84 (1971); State ex. rel.
Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 349, 352, 413 N.E.2d 29, 31-32
(1980); see also W. PAINTER, BUSINESS PLANNING 662 (1975).
27. 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
28. If the sale is for cash, the transaction generally will not be deemed a de facto merger, and
therefore, the traditional rule of nonassumption of liability will apply. See, e.g., Tucker v. Paxson
Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1981).
The rationale behind this element is that if the consideration for the predecessor's assets is
cash, then at all times the predecessor and successor are distinct and separate corporate entities.
Without any common and continuing ownership, the successor corporation cannot be held liable
for decisions of the predecessor made before the asset acquisition. See McKee, 109 N.J. Super. at
566, 264 A.2d at 104.
1988]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(2) requirement in the asset purchase agreement that the predeces-
sor corporation dissolve as soon as possible following the sale
closing date;29
(3) continuation of the predecessor's enterprise; and
(4) assumption by the successor of the liabilities necessary to carry
on the seller's normal business operations. °
The imposition of assumption of liabilities is a fair result when these ele-
ments are met because "[t]he two corporations are no longer strangers after
the asset sale - they are, in effect, merged" into one corporation.31
The last exception to nonassumption of liabilities in an asset acquisition,
the "mere continuation, ' 32 is an equitable doctrine developed mainly to
protect creditors' claims against the predecessor corporation. 33 This excep-
tion is "problematic of application ... because it has never been quite clear
just in what sense a corporation must continue in order to trigger the excep-
tion.",34 However, certain key elements of the exception can be distilled
from case law: (1) continuity of common management, officers, directors;
(2) continuity of common shareholders (i.e., the consideration paid to the
predecessor was stock of the successor); and (3) only one corporation in
29. The rationale behind this element is that by requiring the predecessor to dissolve, the
successor is deemed to have deprived creditors of a remedy against the predecessor. See Ramirez
v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 348, 431 A.2d 811, 820 (1981).
Even if all of the elements of a de facto merger exist, except that the predecessor has not
dissolved, but rather is a wholly-owned subsidiary stripped of all its assets and operated as a mere
instrumentality of the successor-parent, the parent will be held responsible for the liability of the
subsidiary by piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil. See Kelly v. American Precision Indus.,
Inc., 438 So. 2d 29 (Fla. App. 1983).
30. The Shannon court found that the successor had purchased the predecessor's assets solely
with its own stock. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801. Also, the successor had continued the prede-
cessor's manufacturing and sales operations, while the predecessor immediately dissolved by dis-
tributing the successor's stock (which was received as consideration for the sale) to its
shareholders. Id. Hence, the court found the transaction to be a de facto merger, and therefore
the successor corporation was held liable for the defective products sold by the predecessor. Id.
31. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, -, 244 N.W.2d 873, 891-92 (1976)
(Coleman, J., dissenting); see also Grant-Howard Assoc. v. General Housewares Corp., 115 Misc.
2d 704, 454 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1982) (the key factor in finding a de facto merger is how closely the
acquiring corporation structurally resembles the acquired corporation).
For a more extensive treatment of de facto mergers, see Phillips, Product Line Continuity and
Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 912-23 (1983).
32. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at sec. 7122 (in the cases where this exception
applies, in essence it is in the nature of a corporate reorganization, rather than just a sale); see
generally Groover v. West Coast Shipping Co., 479 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); State ex rel.
Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 349, 413 N.E.2d 29 (1980); J. F.
Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365, 369 (1973).
33. See generally Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391 (Iowa 1975); 15 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 13, at sec. 7122.
34. Yamin, supra note 11, at 226.
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existence after the sale of the assets.35 In essence, the policy behind this
exception is the same as that behind the de facto merger exception in that a
corporation should not be able to avoid liabilities merely due to a change in
its form or name.36 Both exceptions concern a situation where two corpo-
rations combine as one final corporation.
The prior discussion shows that the traditional rule of nonassumption of
liabilities by the successor corporation in an asset acquisition, and its excep-
tions, developed to protect the creditors of the predecessor and to protect
the successor from unknown or contingent liability.37 Under the traditional
rule, the successor knows under what circumstances it assumes liability
claims against the predecessor. The rule promotes the free alienability of
corporate assets in a manner similar to the bona fide purchaser (BFP) rule
of property law. The BFP rule holds that a good faith purchaser, who is
without notice of prior claims on the property and pays adequate considera-
tion, will not be held liable for any prior or contingent claims related to that
property.38 In short, the BFP rule promotes not only the free alienability of
35. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451 (1lth Cir. 1985) (no continuation
of management or ownership); Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1984)
(no continuity of shareholders); Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788 (Ala. 1984)
(no "mere continuation" because predecessof did not dissolve); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp.,
254 Ga. 283, _, 328 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1985) (no continuity of ownership when assets are sold for
cash); Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 204,460 N.E.2d 895 (1984) (absent
continuity of stock ownership, a finding of continuation is not warranted); Young v. Fulton Iron
Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 940-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (no continuation found where predeces-
sor continued to manufacture and sell over $1/2 million worth of machines for over one year after
the sale of part of its assets to defendant); Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., 220 Neb. 175,
368 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (commonality of both stock ownership and management); Schumacher v.
Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437, 451 N.E.2d 195 (1983) (mere continuation
exception requires extinguishment of predecessor, and continuity of management, key personnel,
and physical location).
36. See Arthur Elevator Co., 236 N.W.2d at 391-93.
Both the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions are similar because they both
require the elements of continuity of operation and ownership, and the existence of only one
corporation after the sale. The only real distinction appears to be that mere continuation requires
continuity of management, while the de facto merger exception does not. For this reason, it has
been suggested that these two exceptions are, in essence, one exception. See generally Phillips,
supra note 31; Note, Liability of a Successor Corporation for Products Defectively Manufactured by
a Predecessor, 62 NaB. L. REV. 408, 413-16 (1983); see also Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420
F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976); Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801.
37. Yamin, supra note 11, at 206-13; Comment, A Search for the Outer Limits to Successor
Corporation Liability for Defective Products of Predecessors, 51 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 117, 128 (1982)
[hereinafter Outer Limits]; Comment, Choice-of-Law in Minnesota Corporate Successor Products
Liability: Which Rule is the "Better Rule"?, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 373, 376 (1985).
38. For a good analysis of the bona fide purchaser rules as related to successor liability, see
Yamin, supra note 11, at 206-08.
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corporate assets, but also "predictability in corporate transactions" and
"mobility in the business and economic world in general."39
The problem with the policies supporting the traditional rule is that
they developed prior to the advent of modem products liability law and
thus do not take into effect the policy behind strict products liability.'
The policy reasons behind strict products liability favor the injured plaintiff,
which obviously conflicts with traditional corporate law that favors protec-
tion of the corporate environment.
41
II. EMPHASIS & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
The fundamental policy of all tort law is to shift the economic burden of
an injury away from the injured person on to someone else who more fairly
deserves to bear the burden.42 The plaintiff in a strict products liability suit
has a relaxed standard of proof because he or she need not prove the negli-
gence of the manufacturer.43 Rather, the plaintiff need only prove that: (1)
the manufacturer is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
the product; (2) the product was defective or dangerous when it left the
manufacturer's control; and (3) the defect or danger was the cause of the
plaintiff's injury.' This lesser standard of proof is based on several poli-
cies, including:
39. Id. at 207.
40. I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY sec. 2.06(2) (1982); Hill, Products
Liability of a Successor Corporation - Acquisition of "Bad Will" with Good Will, 23 IDEA J.L. &
TECH. 9, 10 (1982); see also Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332,
- 431 A.2d 811, 815-16 (1981) (traditional rule was developed not in response to the interests of
products liability parties, but rather to protect the interests of commercial creditors and dissenting
shareholders); Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 303, 376 N.W.2d at 825.
Several decisions invoking the general rule date back more than 75 years, well before the
development of products liability law. See, e.g., Pennison v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 93 Wis.
344, 67 N.W. 702 (1896).
41. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
42. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS sec. 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984) [Hereinafter "PROSSER ON TORTS"].
43. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 55, 59-60 (1967); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, see. 3; PROSSER ON
TORTS, supra note 42, see. 103.
In fact, whether the manufacturer was negligent is irrelevant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS sec. 402A(2)(a) (1965) (seller of defective product liable even if seller exercised due
care).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 402A(2)(a) (1965). Specifically, Section 402A
provides:
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A. The consumer finds it too difficult to prove negligence against
the manufacturer.
B. Strict liability provides an effective and necessary incentive to
manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible.
C. The manufacturer is in a better position to protect against
harm, by insuring against liability for it, and, by adding the cost
of insurance to the price of his product, to pass the loss on to
the general public.
D. By placing the product on the market, the seller represents to
the public that it is fit; and he intends and expects that it will be
purchased and consumed in reliance upon that representation.
E. The costs of accidents should be placed on the party best able to
determine whether there are means to prevent that accident. 45
In essence, these policy rationales favor a shifting of the burden of the harm
due to defective products away from the injured consumer and on to a busi-
ness manufacturer.46 Such policies directly conflict with traditional corpo-
rate principles which favor the nonassumption of contingent liabilities by a
successor corporation in an asset acquisition.
This conflict was recognized by the California Supreme Court in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products.47 That court stated that traditional corporate
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
Id.
Note that, although the plaintiff need not prove any negligence on the manufacturer's part,
strict products liability is not absolute liability. This is because the plaintiff must prove that the
product was defective and because the defendant has several possible affirmative defenses, such as
assumption of risk or misuse of the product. P. RHEINGOLD & S. BIRNBAUM, PRODUCT LIABIL-
rry: LAW, PRACTICE, SCIENCE 3 (2d ed. 1975).
45. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 764-65 (7th
ed. 1982).
46. For a more in-depth analysis of the policies behind products liability suits as related to
successor liability issues, see Nielsen, Liability of Successor Corporations, 32 FED'N INS. COUNS.
Q. 63, 70-71 (1981) (argues that purpose behind strict products liability law is to ensure that the
costs of products, as to society as a whole, is properly reflected in the cost of products which cause
harm); Outer Limits, supra note 37, at 120-22 nn. 18-26, 129; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-24 (1960) (good discussion of the general policy behind strict
liability).
47. 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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rules based on the needs of corporate transactions cannot be used on the
issue of a manufacturer's liability for defective products "unless those rules
also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed."48 Under this
reasoning, it appears that the traditional rule of nonassumption of liability
(developed to protect creditors and the successor corporation and to pro-
mote free alienability of corporate assets)4 9 should not be applied to cases
dealing with a successor corporation's strict products liability, because that
rule does not serve the purposes of strict products liability doctrine."0 Per-
haps it is because of such a conflict that several courts have attempted
either to expand the traditional rule exceptions or create new law in this
area.
III. CASES CHANGING THE TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS
OF NONASSUMPTION
A. Expansion of the Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions
to the Traditional Rule of Nonassumption of Liabilities
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. " is one of the first cases to recognize the problem
of holding a successor corporation liable for defective products of its prede-
cessor as one of tort law rather than strictly corporate law.52 Under the
facts in that case, the court imposed successor liability by expanding the
continuation exception. 53
In Cyr, key employees of the predecessor formed a corporation to
purchase the assets of the predecessor following the death of the predeces-
sor's sole proprietor.54 The new owners did not notify customers of the
predecessor that there was a new company, and the new owners advertised
as an on-going, forty year old business. 55 The successor corporation contin-
ued to produce the same product previously manufactured by the old com-
pany.56 Subsequently, two employees of a printing company were injured
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 44.
51. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law).
52. See id. at 1153.
53. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
54. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1151. Thus, there was no continuity of ownership as required under the
mere continuation exception. See supra text accompanying note 35.
55. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1151-52. The court stated the problem as being that "[o]n the one hand
we face the problem of the buyer, who thinks it is purchasing a known set of assets and liabilities.
On the other, we face users of a product who are not conscious of any change in responsibility on
the part of the manufacturer." Id. at 1152.
56. Id. at 1151.
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by a defective printing press manufactured by the predecessor.5 7 The court
found the successor strictly liable for the defective printing press, even
though there was no continuity of ownership as required under the mere
continuation exception. This expanded rule was prompted by tort and
products liability policy, evidenced by the Cyr court's emphasis that: (1)
manufacturers rather than consumers should bear the risks inherent in pro-
ducing goods;5 9 (2) the successor can calculate and insure against risks
which accompany the acquisition of the predecessor's manufacturing enter-
prise;6° (3) the successor is in the position to improve on the predecessor's
design of the product;61 and (4) the successor has profited from the prede-
cessor's accumulated goodwill which the products have earned.62 Other
courts have similarly relaxed the traditional requirements to the exceptions
of nonassumption of the predecessor's liability in order to satisfy the plain-
tiff's claim.63
Federal cases such as Cyr have made substantial changes by expanding
the assumption of liabilities by a successor corporation. According to the
57. Id. at 1148.
58. Id. at 1153-54. The court stated that "ownership of the entity which maintains essen-
tially the same name will not be the sole controlling determinant of liability." Id. at 1154.
59. See infra note 62. But see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text in that the risk-
spreading rationale is generally not valid, especially in successor liability cases.
60. See infra note 62. But see infra notes 147-55.
61. See infra note 62. But see infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text in that a successor
will have the incentive to improve the design of its products even without liability for its predeces-
sor's defective products.
62. Specifically, the Cyr court stated:
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic judgment that the
hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from defective products are better borne by the
manufacturer than by the consumer. The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the ex-
perience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the con-
sumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. The successor knows the product,
is as able to calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in position to insure therefor
and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the
quality of the product.... [I]n the most real sense [the successor] is profiting from an [sic]
exploiting all of the accumulated good will which the products have earned, both in its
outward representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the same line of
equipment.
Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
63. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974) (dissolution
of the predecessor is not a necessary element, but rather only a factor); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel
Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, -, 434 A.2d 106, 107-08 (1981) (broadened the requirement that dissolu-
tion of the predecessor be "as soon as practicable" to "within a reasonable time" if the asset-
selling corporation is more shell than substance).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," however, federal courts sitting in
diversity, such as the Cyr court, are limited to established state law. This
means that the issue of successor liability is controlled by the traditional
rules unless the particular state's courts or legislature change the substan-
tive law." The discussion of the next two cases illustrates such a change.66
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. ,67 the Michigan Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the mere continuation and de facto merger excep-
tions by holding a successor corporation liable for its predecessor's defective
products, even though the successor purchased the predecessor's assets for
cash.68 In Turner, the allegedly defective machine was manufactured in
1903 by "Old Sheridan., 69 In 1964, Old Sheridan was purchased for cash
by Harris Intertype Corporation through a newly formed subsidiary, New
Sheridan.7" Old Sheridan immediately dissolved.7 In 1968, Turner's em-
ployer purchased the machine secondhand.72
The Turner court began its analysis by stating that the case was "a
products liability case first and foremost. ' 73 The court then reasoned that
the traditional corporate rule of nonassumption of liability had developed to
protect creditors and shareholders, rather than products liability plaintiffs.
The court further reasoned that this rule was "not applicable to meeting the
substantially different problems associated with products liability."74 The
court cited language in the California Supreme Court decision of Ray v.
Alad Corp., 5 indicating that a break from corporate law is proper when the
strict liability of successor corporations is at issue.7 6 Despite this strong
language that tort law should apply, the Turner court curiously remained
within the traditional corporate law framework in its holding. The court
created a four-part expanded continuation exception.77 This exception
holds irrelevant whether the purchase of the predecessor's assets was for
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Essentially, Erie held that when a federal court sits in diversity it
must apply only the law of the appropriate jurisdiction as interpreted by that jurisdiction's highest
court.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
67. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
68. Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
69. Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 875.
70. Id.
71. Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
72. Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 875.
73. Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 877.
74. Id. at , 244 N.W.2d at 881.
75. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
76. Turner, 397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 880-81.
77. The Turner elements are:
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cash rather than for its own stock.78 Thus, while eliminating the traditional
emphasis on stock or continuity of ownership, the Turner court remained
focused on the overall process of the corporation's succession.7
B. The Product Line Exception of Ray v. Alad Corp.
The California Supreme Court broke away from the traditional corpo-
rate law analysis of successor liability by creating the "product line" excep-
tion in Ray v. Alad Corp. s0 In Ray, the defendant corporation paid cash for
the predecessor's plant, equipment, inventory, trade name, and goodwill,
and continued to manufacture the same line of ladders under the same
brand name."1 The defendant-successor used the same equipment, designs,
and personnel as the predecessor had used. 2 Although the predecessor dis-
solved, there was no outward indication of any ownership change.8" Subse-
quently, the plaintiff was injured by a defective ladder manufactured by the
predecessor.8 4 The Ray court refused to adopt the Cyr expansion to the
traditional exceptions 5 because to do so would set an undesirable precedent
for assessing liabilities to creditors outside of a strict products liability con-
text.8 6 The court believed that strict liability is a unique problem in dealing
(1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including, appar-
ently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and even the
[predecessor's] name.
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved
soon after distribution of consideration received from the buying corporation.
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordi-
narily necessary for the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller
corporation.
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective continuation of
the seller corporation.
Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
78. Contrast the nonrequirement of ownership continuity to the de facto merger and continu-
ation exceptions of the traditional rule, which both require a continuity of ownership between the
predecessor and successor or, in other words, payment to the predecessor in the successor's stock.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-36.
79. See generally supra note 77; Turner, 397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
80. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
81. Id. at 26, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
82. Id. at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
83. Id. at 27-28, 560 P.2d at 6-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
84. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
85. The Cyr expansion holds that there need be no continuity of ownership, so it is irrelevant
whether the consideration paid to the predecessor by the successor for its assets is stock or cash.
See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
86. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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with a successor corporation and, therefore, deserves special
consideration.8 7
The Ray court gave this area "special consideration" by developing a
new rule applicable when dealing with strict products liability of a successor
corporation. The court held that a corporation "which acquires a manufac-
turing business and continues the output of its line of products... assumes
strict tort liability for defects.., of the same product line previously manu-
factured and distributed by the entity from which the business was ac-
quired."88 The court offered three justifications for this rule:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the [form of the] successor's
acquisiton of the business;
(2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's
risk-spreading rule; and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility
for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to
the original manufacturer's goodwill being enjoyed by the suc-
cessor in the continued operation of the business. 89
The Ray court further noted that adoption of the product line exception
promotes the policies of strict products liability. It also promotes the pro-
tection of defenseless victims from defective products and the placement of
the risks and costs of compensating those victims on the manufacturer and
society.90 The Ray court's focus turned away from the traditional corpo-
rate law analysis favoring nonassumption of liabilities to a products liability
analysis offering increased protection to the injured plaintiff.9"
C. The Wisconsin Approach in Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc.
Prior to the 1985 case of Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,92 it was uncer-
tain how the Wisconsin Supreme Court would decide the issue of a succes-
sor's liability for defective products manufactured by the predecessor
corporation in cases where the successor purchased the predecessor's assets
87. Id.
88. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
89. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
90. Id at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
91. See generally supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
This "product line" exception has gained limited acceptance, being adopted only in three other
states. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dawejko, 290 Pa. Super.
15, 434 A.2d 106; Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
92. 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985).
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for cash.93 In the 1982 case of Cody v. Sheboygan Machine Co., the Wis-
consin Supreme Court failed to explicitly define the "identity" required be-
tween the predecessor and successor in order to hold the successor
corporation liable for its predecessor's defective products." The Cody
court placed heavy, if not complete, emphasis on the lack of product line
continuity in not finding liability on the defendant successor corporation.96
The Cody court's rationale is close to that in the Ray holding,9 7 giving the
appearance that Wisconsin moved away from the traditional application of
corporate law toward the tort-based applications of Turner and Ray.9"
Three years after Cody, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Fish v.
Amsted Industries, Inc.99 In Fish, the successor corporation purchased its
predecessor's assets with cash and expressly refused to assume any product
liability claims against the predecessor. The Fish court made it clear that
Wisconsin adheres only to the existing corporate rules and, therefore, de-
nied the plaintiff's product liability claim because of the express refusal in
the asset acquisition to assume any such claims. The Fish court further
stated that "[i]dentity refers to identity of ownership, not identity of prod-
uct line,' '" °" clearing up any doubts arising from Cody, particularly con-
cerning whether Wisconsin would adopt the product line rule. In refuting
93. As will be explained, the court did not make itself clear in its two decisions in this area in
1982. For the distinction of the consideration being cash rather than stock, see supra note 28.
94. 108 Wis. 2d 105, 321 N.W.2d 142 (1982).
95. Id. at 107, 321 N.W.2d at 143. Cody was the companion case to Tift v. Forage King
Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982). The Tift decision held that the test of liability
was one of "identity" between the successor and predecessor. Tift, 108 Wis. 2d at 75-80, 322
N.W.2d at 15-17.
96. 108 Wis. 2d at 107, 321 N.W.2d at 143. The Cody court also justified its decision in Tift
by emphasizing product line continuity. Id. at 106-07, 321 N.W.2d at 143.
97. See generally supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
98. See generally Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985), appeal denied per curiam, 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, _, 689 P.2d 368, 386 (1984) (the court states that Wisconsin in Tift has chosen to
follow the Turner mere continuation approach); Tiff, 108 Wis. 2d at 83, 322 N.W.2d at 19 (Cal-
low, J., dissenting) (states that the majority has reached its decision by "[i]ncorrectly applying
well-established intercorporate principles .. "); Grove, Successor Products Liability: Wisconsin's
Approach in Tift v. Forage King Industries, Inc., 55 Wis. BAR BULL. 17 (October 1982) (Grove
concludes that even though the court states that it is applying traditional corporate law, in fact
Wisconsin has probably adopted a product line exception).
For an interesting analysis and prediction of how Wisconsin would decide the successor liabil-
ity issue when faced with it, see Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Successor Corpora-
tions, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 595 (1978) (based on prior Wisconsin decisions, the author concludes
that Wisconsin will adopt the product line rule).
99. 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985).
100. Id. at 301, 376 N.W.2d at 824.
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the three policy reasons behind Ray,1"1 the court made it clear that it would
not adopt the Ray or Turner rules. 10 2
IV. ADDITIONAL THEORIES OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. The Emerging Duty to Warn
The duty to warn imposes liability on a successor corporation for breach
of its own duty of care10 3 rather than for acts of its predecessor as to the
continuity of enterprise and the product line doctrines."° A part of the
rationale for imposing the duty on the successor to warn about defects in its
predecessor's products is because the successor benefits from the predeces-
sor's goodwill and customer contacts, and also because the successor repre-
sents itself to be the same enterprise as the predecessor. 10 5 Additionally,
because the successor is in the best position to discover pre-existing defects,
it has the duty to test and improve its predecessor's product. 106
Courts generally require that two prerequisites be met before invoking
the duty to warn on the successor: 10 7 (1) it must be shown that the succes-
sor knew or should have known of the defect; and (2) there must be some
special relationship between the successor and the purchasers of the prede-
cessor's products. As to the first requirement, the successor has a duty to
warn if it has actual knowledge of defects in the predecessor's products. '0 8
Whether the successor should have known of defects in its predecessor's
products is purely a question of fact.109 Factors which the courts consider
include: sufficient contact between the successor corporation and purchas-
101. See supra text accompanying note 89.
102. See Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 304-10, 376 N.W.2d at 825-28.
Note that Fish was a four-to-three decision. Id. at 294, 376 N.W.2d at 820. This close deci-
sion, as well as prior Wisconsin case law, suggests that Wisconsin would adopt a tort-based rule if
an appropriate one were developed. See generally Grove, supra note 98; Comment, supra note
98.
103. See Sardell, Products Liability and Successor Responsibility for Defects, 6 CORP. L.
REv. 82, 84 (1983); Note, Intermediate and Successor Corporations Strictly Liable Under Product
Line Standard, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 327, 350 (1982).
104. See generally supra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
105. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 1980).
106. See Gee, 615 F.2d at 865-66; see also Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa.
1971). This duty to warn is imposed on the successor because its control over the product enables
it to have power to prevent harm from a pre-existing defect in the product. Shane, 332 F. Supp. at
530.
107. See generally Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying
Wisconsin law).
108. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. See, e.g., Shane, 332 F. Supp. at 530-31; Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc.,
347 N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D. 1984) (only when there is no genuine fact issue as to imputed knowl-
edge is summary judgment appropriate).
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ers of the predecessor's goods;'1 0 remoteness in time between the predeces-
sor-manufacturer and the defendant-successor;"' and geographical
remoteness between the predecessor and successor.' 2 As to the second re-
quirement, that of a special relationship in order to impose a duty to warn,
courts generally require a "continuation" by the successor of the relation-
ship which the predecessor had with any of its particular customers." 3
This continuation is usually evidenced by the successor taking over the
predecessor's service contracts, actually servicing the products, and know-
ing the product owners' identity and location. 1 4 Courts have favorably
adopted a duty to warn even when they have refused to adopt the Ray and
Turner doctrines." 5
110. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(contacts between purchasers of the predecessor's goods and the successor corporation were insuf-
ficient to impute knowledge of defects on the successor); Travis, 565 F.2d at 448-49; Gee, 615 F.2d
at 866; Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 117 111. App. 3d 435, 453 N.E.2d 792 (1983);
Radziul v. Hooper, Inc., 125 Misc. 2d 362, 479 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1984).
111. See, e.g., Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1981) (no imputa-
tion of knowledge because the defendant successor company was too far remote from the prede-
cessor due to many successor-purchasers between the defendant and the original predecessor's sale
of its assets).
112. See Jacobs, 512 F.Supp. at 178.
113. See, ag., Gee, 615 F.2d at 866. The emphasis on this "continuation" seems to be the
successor's ability to control the product, as evidenced by a continuation of business relationships
between the successor corporation and the predecessor's customers. See Jacobs, 512 F. Supp. at
186; Sardell, supra note 103, at 84.
114. Tucker, 645 F.2d at 626; see generally Leannais, 565 F.2d at 442; Gee, 615 F.2d at 866;
Travis, 565 F.2d at 449; Jacobs, 512 F.2d at 185; Gonzalez, 117 Ill. App. 3d 435, 453 N.E.2d 792
(1983); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 254, 676 P.2d 1290, 1295 (1984); Radziul,
125 Misc. 2d 362, 479 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1984); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 128
(Vt. 1984) (citing Travis).
The focus in deciding whether there is a sufficient relationship between the successor and
purchasers of the predecessor's goods on which to invoke a duty to warn has been upon the actual
or potential economic advantage to the successor corporation. See Radziul, 125 Misc. 2d at -,
479 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27.
It has also been said that there is no exhaustive list of factors which the courts can consider to
find a sufficient relationship. Rather, the courts appear to use a risk/benefit analysis to see if it is
fair to impose the duty to warn. See Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d
117, 125 (N.D. 1984).
115. See, e.g., Leannais, 565 F.2d at 441-43 (although the court refused to adopt the product
line rule, it raised the possibility that defendant's succession to predecessores service contracts
provided a "sufficient nexus to establish a duty to warn"); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59
N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983) (the court upheld the lower court's dismis-
sal of plaintiff's claims based upon the modern theories of successor liability, but reversed and
remanded with respect to the lower court's summary judgment against the plaintiff based upon a
duty to warn theory).
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B. The Bona Fide Purchaser Solution
A final alternative to the adoption of the Cyr, Turner, or Ray excep-
tions 116 is an expansion of the bona fide purchaser doctrine 17 to the issue of
the asset-purchasing successor's assumption of products liability for defec-
tive products sold by its predecessor. Under such an expansion, the succes-
sor is not held liable if it purchased the predecessor's assets in good faith
without notice of any existing or potential defects of the predecessor's prod-
ucts.ls On the other hand, if the successor knew or should have known of
the existing or potential defects in its predecessor's products, the successor
is held liable for the product liability claims. Whether the successor knew
or should have known of defects in its predecessor's product is purely a
question of fact.' 19 Factors which the courts might consider to impute
knowledge include: predecessor's liability record; predecessor's insurance
premiums as compared to similarly-situated corporations; and data as to
the predecessor's quality control or design safety. If a reasonable investiga-
tion of these factors does not result in any basis for imputing knowledge,
the successor should be able to enter into the transaction free of liability for
its predecessor's products.'2 0 As will be seen, this is a fair result because it
generally satisfies the principles of tort law12' as well as the traditional cor-
porate law policies of promoting the free alienability of corporate assets. 122
116. See generally supra notes 51-102 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
118. For applications of the bona fide purchaser doctrine as applied to commercial transac-
tions, see Dolan, The UC.C. Framework- Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59
B.U.L. REV. 811, 813-15 (1979); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
119. This requirement of some knowledge would be similar to that which is required to im-
pose a duty to warn on the successor. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
120. See generally J. CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 187-88, 286-89
(1975) (bona fide purchaser (BFP) rules as related to real estate transactions); Gilmore, supra note
118, at 1057 (the bona fide purchaser is protected so that "commercial transactions may be en-
gaged in without elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of
property by one who offers it for sale").
121. See infra notes 234-44 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
The BFP expansion will also ease the uncertainty (as to the appropriate rule) that now exists
in jurisdictions that have not yet changed the traditional rule of nonassumption of the predeces-
sor's liability. See Hoffman, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break from Tradi-
tion, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 369-70 (1978); Note, Products Liability - Corporations - Asset
Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REV. 905, 916 (1977).
[Vol. 71:815
1988] SUCCESSOR CORPORATION LIABILITY
V. ANALYSIS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY RATIONALES USED TO
JUSTIFY SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Introduction
A number of various strict products liability rationales are used to jus-
tify the imposition of strict products liability on a successor corporation
which, through a cash purchase, acquires the assets of another corporation
for cash. The Cyr'23 and Ray'24 courts both expounded on some of these
policy rationales, which include: (1) the successor has the ability to assume
the predecessor-manufacturer's risk-spreading role because it may insure
against the risk of injury and pass those costs on to the consuming public,
while the consumer is basically helpless; 125 (2) the successor is the entity
that should be responsible for improvements in the product's quality and
safety 26 because liability serves as a deterrent against the manufacture of
unsafe products; 27 (3) the manufacturer-predecessor has an active role in
123. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
125. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (lst Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19
Cal. 3d 22, 30, 560 P.2d 3, 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579-80 (1977); see also Ramirez v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, _, 431 A.2d 811, 817, 820-21 (1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.,
290 Pa. Super. 15, _, 434 A.2d 106, 109 (1981); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d
581, -, 689 P.2d 368, 387 (1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 315-16 (1985)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
See supra note 62 for the Cyr court's excellent explanation of the rationale behind the risk-
spreading rule. But see infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text in that the risk-spreading ra-
tionale is not a sufficient justification for imposing liability on a manufacturer nor on a successor
corporation.
For more on this risk-spreading rule as applied in products liability cases, see Bachner v.
Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, _
150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa.
362, -, 372 A.2d 736, 739 (1977); Hoven v. Kelbe, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391
(1977). See also Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposal for the Application of Strict
Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U.L. REV. 391, 414-15 (1978). But see Sachs, Negligence or
Strict Product Liability: Is there Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 259, 271-73 (1978); infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text (risk-spreading rationale
is not a valid justification).
126. See Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154. The Cyr court stated that "[tihe manufacturer's successor,
carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is... in a better position.., to
gauge the risks .... The successor knows the product [and] is as able to calculate the risk of
defects as the predecessor..... Cyr, 501 F.2d 1154; see also Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at _, 560 P.2d at 9,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 579; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at -, 431 A.2d at 822; Dawejko, 290 Pa. Super. at -, 434
A.2d at 108 (citations omitted); Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at -, 689 P.2d at 386. (citations omitted).
127. See Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 316, 376 N.W.2d at 831 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Justice
Abrahamson also suggested that liability might encourage the successor to improve the product.
Id. at 317, 376 N.W.2d at 832 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). This suggestion is incorrect, how-
ever, because a corporation would always have the incentive to improve its own products in order
to avoid liability for its own defective products, regardless of any successor liability.
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causing the plaintiff's harm by placing the product in the stream of com-
merce;"' and (4) the manufacturer-predecessor impliedly represents the
product's safety by placing the product into the stream of commerce, and
that representation is violated with a defective product.129 An additional
rationale, which is not behind strict products liability in general, but rather,
is related only to strict products liability in successor liability cases, is that
the successor profits from the predecessor's goodwill from those
products. 130
A problem occurs with these policy rationales, however, since determin-
ing whether to impose strict liability on a successor corporation, courts
should determine which combinations of rationales are sufficient to justify
successor liability. The courts should also determine the importance of the
rationales as an element of imposing liability. Courts generally fail to make
such determinations, as illustrated by Cyr.'3 1 In Cyr, the court first stated
that there were three rationales which support imposing liability on the suc-
cessor: (1) the successor should bear the costs of the plaintiff's injuries be-
cause it can calculate and insure against the risks of defective products; 132
(2) the successor is able to improve upon the product and, therefore, liabil-
ity serves as a deterrent to others;13 3 and (3) that the successor profits from
128. The predecessor had an active role in causing the plaintiff's harm because the defective
product was placed into the stream of commerce by the predecessor, irrespective of whether it was
negligent. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 188-90 & 201-05 and
accompanying text for the proposition that in some cases successor liability is not supported by
the causation rationale.
129. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,_, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
In short, "[b]y placing the product on the market, the seller represents to the public that it is
fit; and he intends and expects that it will be purchased and consumed in reliance upon that
representation." W. PROSSER, V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIAL ON TORTS 765 (7th ed.
1982).
130. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154 (the successor profits from "the accumulated good will which the
products have earned, both in its outward representations of continuity and in its internal adher-
ence to the same line of equipment"); Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582
(successor liabilify "causes the one who takes the benefit [to] bear the burden"); Ramirez, 86 N.J.
at 431, 431 A.2d at 822 (successor liability is "justified as a burden necessarily attached to its
enjoyment of [its predecessor's] trade name, good will and the continuation of an established
manufacturing enterprise"); Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at -, 689 P.2d at 388 ("[t]he benefit of being
able to take over a going concern... is necessarily burdened with potential products liability").
These conclusory assertions stated by the four courts above fail to analyze whether it is the
successor or, more likely, the predecessor who actually receives the benefit of good will from the
sale of the predecessor's products. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
131. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); see generally supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.




the predecessor's goodwill.' 34 The Cyr court found the successor liable
even though the successor neither introduced the product into the stream of
commerce, nor made an implied representation of the product's quality or
safety. 135 The court, although mentioning these last two factors, failed to
state why they were insignificant to its decision.' 36 An analysis of these two
rationales might have resulted in the court finding nonliability rather than
liability. 137
An analysis of the various expansions in the area of successor liability' 8
requires that the four policy rationales of strict liability, which the Cyr
court mentioned, 139 be examined for their importance in successor strict
products liability development. These policy rationales must then be ana-
lyzed as to whether they support the various alternatives of successor liabil-
ity.'" ° This Comment will engage in such an analysis, but first, it will be
shown that the justification of imposing successor liability is not a valid
basis for liability because the successor allegedly profits from its predeces-
sor's goodwill.
B. Analysis of the Goodwill Justification
Several courts have conclusively stated that successor liability is equita-
ble because the successor profits from the goodwill accumulated by the
predecessor in the predecessor's sales of its products.14 ' These courts fail to
realize that any profits went to the predecessor who sold the product and
not to the successor. 142 The successor actually paid for the predecessor's
goodwill and reputation for excellence in the asset acquisition price."13
That reputation is tarnished whenever defective products manufactured by
the predecessor are discovered, lowering the value of the goodwill paid for
by the successor."4 Additionally, if the successor is held liable for defective
products sold by its predecessor, it is being forced to pay twice for the pred-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.; see also Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (emphasizing
risk-spreading rule, while ignoring the other factors).
137. See generally infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 51-91 & 103-22 and accompanying text.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
140. See infra notes 182-244 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E. D. Tenn. 1978); Martin,
102 Wash. 2d at -, 689 P.2d at 392 (Pearson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
143. Tft, 108 Wis. 2d 72, 99, 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Callow, J., dissenting).
144. Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
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ecessor's goodwill. 145 In essence, successor liability denies the successor the
benefit of its bargain because: first, it forces the successor to pay more for
its predecessor's goodwill than was agreed to in its asset acquisition agree-
ment;14 6 and second, the successor may no longer rely on the reputation of
the predecessor established by manufacturing and selling those products.
The goodwill rationale is rarely a sufficient justification for imposing succes-
sor liability because the successor does not profit from the predecessor's
goodwill and the successor loses the value of the predecessor's reputation
for excellence when defective products of the predecessor are discovered.
C. Analysis of the Risk-Spreading Role
The rationale that the successor corporation is in a better position to
calculate the risks and spread the costs is rarely a sufficient justification for
imposing strict products liability on the successor corporation for defective
products of its predecessor. First, there appears to be no case law under the
theory of strict products liability which makes the plaintiff's recovery de-
pendent upon whether the plaintiff or defendant is in a better position to
spread the cost of the harm.147 Although the cases infer that the successor
corporation is in a good position to absorb the cost, in reality the imposition
of successor liability could severely cripple industries which are comprised
mostly of small corporations.14 This potential industry-crippling effect be-
comes apparent when it is realized that insurance for defects caused by a
predecessor's product is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and, even
if obtainable, its cost is usually prohibitive.49
145. Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, -, 433
N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (1982); Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at-, 689 P.2d at 392 (Pearson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 309, 376 N.W.2d at 828 (1985); Tift, 108 Wis. 2d at
99, 322 N.W.2d at 26 (Callow, J., dissenting).
146. Manh Hung Nguyen, 104 Ill. App. 3d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 1112.
147. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "in most strict liability cases, the ability
or inability of the defendant to bear the costs of that liability will not prevent liability. The de-
fendant has violated a duty and should be made liable for the violation." Downtowner, Inc. v.
Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 124 (N.D. 1984) (quoting Manh Hung Nguyen, 104 Ill.
App. 3d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 1111).
148. Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049-50 (Fla. 1982); Manh Hung Nguyen,
104 Ill. App. 3d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 1111; Ramirez, 86 N.J. 322, -, 431 A.2d 811, 826 (1981)
(Schreiber, J., concurring); Ostrowski, 144 Vt. at -, 479 A.2d at 127; Tiff, 108 Wis. 2d at 96-97,
322 N.W.2d at 25 (Callow, J. dissenting); see also Comment, Products Liability and Successor
Corporation: Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availa-
bility of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000 (1980); Comment, The Federal.
Government and the Product Liability Problem: From Task-Force Investigation to Decisions by the
Administration, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 573 (1978).
149. See Tiff, 108 Wis. 2d at 95-96, 322 N.W.2d at 24 (Callow, J., dissenting) (citing Ramirez,
86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring)) (quoting Products Liability Insurance:
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The second reason why the risk-spreading role rationale fails to justify
successor liability is that if cost-spreading is truly a goal, it would be more
efficiently met through some system of social insurance. 1 0 Social insurance
would be more efficient in cost-spreading than our tort system, because so-
cial insurance simplifies the plaintiff's burden of proof to merely that of
proving the extent of its accidental injuries. Also, social insurance ensures
the cost of injuries is spread evenly throughout society, rather than just
among defendants in the current tort system.151
A third reason why the risk-spreading rationale fails as a justification
for successor liability is that it conflicts with the role of deterrence in our
tort system.' 52 If cost-spreading is maximized through a form of social or
industry-wide insurance,' 53 manufacturers have no direct financial deter-
rent to the production of defective products since the manufacturer's pay-
ments for such insurance are independent of any accidents caused by their
products.154 It is because of this lack of a deterrent, as well as the unavaila-
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment, and Business of The House Committee
on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (testimony of Charles W. Whalen, Jr.)); REPORT
ON THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 6 (1986) (busi-
nesses have severe problems in the "availability of insurance, affordability of insurance coverage,
and adequacy of coverage"), H. Rep. No. 190, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1981) (reprinted in 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1432); Product Liability Risk Retention Act: Hearings on
H.R. 2120 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1981) (reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1437-40).
Contrast the difficulty today in obtaining products liability insurance to the fact that about ten
to fifteen years ago, products liability insurance was a "casual extra, often offered to major cus-
tomers free of charge as a special inducement for capturing other lines of business." R. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 4 (1980).
For a general review of insurance for products liability, see G. SULLIVAN, PRODUCTS LIABIL-
ITY: WHO NEEDS IT? 125-68 (1979).
150. Social insurance has been recommended as a means to solve the successor liability prob-
lem. See, e.g., Schwartz, Products Liability and No-Fault Insurance: Can One Live Without the
Other?, 12 FORUM 130 (1976-77); Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisi-
tions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 110 (1975); Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break
from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 375 (1978).
151. See generally E. BERNZWEIG, BY ACCIDENT NOT DESIGN: THE CASE FOR COMPREN-
SIVE INJURY REPARATIONS (1980). A social insurance program probably is not currently feasible
in the United States, although other countries had success with such programs. Id. at 191-209.
152. See infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text; see also G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 94 (1970).
153. See, eg., Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. sees. 3901-02 (permits the formation of
risk retention groups within an industry to insure and spread the products liability of its
members).
154. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 152, at 64-65.
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bility of products liability insurance,15 that the risk-spreading role ration-
ale is generally not a sufficient justification to impose successor liability.
D. Analysis of the Deterrence Factor
General deterrence in tort law plays the role of reducing accidents by
making "activities more expensive, and thereby less attractive to the extent
of the accident costs they cause." '1 56 The idea of this general deterrence is
to charge the party manufacturing the goods with the costs of the accidents
their goods cause, resulting in accident costs becoming a cost of manufac-
turing, like labor and material costs.1 1 7 If manufacturers know they will be
liable for the costs of accidents their products cause, the deterrence theory
encourages manufacturers to make safer products in order to avoid the ex-
tra costs of accidents. 158 The end result of this theory is that manufacturers
will make safer products whenever it is cheaper than paying the costs of
accidents caused by their products. 59 A final element of the general deter-
rence theory is that the party to be charged with the costs of accidents
should be the one who can "avoid the accident costs most cheaply through
some safety measures or otherwise."' 60
The deterrence rationale is a sufficient justification for imposing liability
in our tort system even though it is shown that this rationale does not sup-
port all of the successor liability theories.161 When a manufacturer is held
strictly liable for its defective products, it is deterred from selling products
with high accident costs and will, therefore, have an incentive to improve its
products.162 Courts generally will not impose liability if the deterrence ra-
155. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
156. G. CALABRESI, supra note 152, at 26.
157. See id. at 70.
Requiring the successor to be liable ensures that the costs of product injuries are treated "as a
cost of... doing business, thus assuring that... enterprises willfully 'pay their way' " in society.
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980). Impos-
ing the costs of product injuries as a cost of doing business encourages all economically efficient
safety improvements. See also infra text accompanying note 158.
Requiring the successor to be liable for defective products of its predecessor also serves as a
deterrent against the manufacture of defective products in another way: the predecessor will
probably receive a lower consideration in the sale of its assets if its successor is going to be liable
for the predecessor's defective products. Therefore, in order to increase the value of its assets, the
predecessor has the incentive not to produce defective products. However, this rationale is not
considered to be sufficient justification. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
158. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 152, at 73.
159. For an example of when it might be cheaper to assume the costs of accidents that one
causes as compared to implementing safety precautions see id. at 73-75.
160. See id. at 135.
161. See infra notes 191-96 & 206-12 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
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tionale is not supported in a particular case. This is evidenced by the fact
that the manufacturer is not held liable for injuries involving its product if-
(1) there is an unforeseeable alteration of the product which causes the
harm or accident; 6 3 (2) the product is unforeseeably misused or abnor-
mally used;1 (3) the plaintiff assumes the inherent risk of the product;165
or (4) if the plaintiff does not heed a warning about the product's danger.66
In those situations where liability is not imposed, it is perhaps due to the
fact that the deterrence rationale is not supported since someone other than
the manufacturer, usually the product user or consumer, is best able to im-
plement some type of safety measure more cheaply. This analysis shows
that liability for product-caused injuries should not be imposed upon the
manufacturer unless the deterrence rationale is applicable.
E. Analysis of the Causation Factor
Strict liability may have a relaxed standard of proof because the plaintiff
need not prove negligence of the manufacturer, 167 but some type of causa-
tion or responsibility linking the manufacturer to the harm must still exist.
Liability should not be placed on a manufacturer unless it has created the
risk and caused the injury by its defective products.1 68 Manufacturers are
not held liable for product-related injuries to which the manufacturers have
no connection or any'responsibility to rectify.1 69 Rather, under strict prod-
ucts liability, manufacturers should be held liable only if the product's de-
163. See generally Cartwright, Effect ofAlteration of the Product; Furnishing of Safety Devices
as an Option or Accessory; and Statute of Limitations in Products Cases, 1 S. METH. U. PRODS.
LIAB. INST. sec. 8.02 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1980).
164. See generally Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability- Prelude
to Comparative Fault, 1 S. METH. U. PRODS. LIAB. INST. sec. 9.04 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1980).
Cases related to this issue include: Peterson v. Parke Davis & Co., 705 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Colo.
App. 1985) (misuse is any type of use or conduct which is improper in light of qualities and
characteristics of the product itself); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 345 (Wyo.
1986) (no liability for injuries caused by unforeseeable alterations in the product rather than by
original defects).
165. See generally Sales, supra note 164, at sec. 9.03; see, e.g., Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App.
3d 591, -., 484 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1985) (assumption of risk is found when the plaintiff volunta-
rily chooses to encounter a known, unreasonable risk associated with a product).
166. See generally Downing, Duty to Warn in Product Liability Cases, 1 S. METH. U. PRODS.
LIAB. INST. see. 6.01 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1980).
167. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
168. See Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort - A Convergence of Two
Opposing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 153 (1980).
169. See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 42, secs. 97-102, at 690-712.
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fective or dangerous condition was present when it left the manufacturer's
control. 170
It may be argued that causation is a weak rationale behind strict prod-
ucts liability doctrine because often retailers, distributors, and wholesalers
are held liable for the sale of a defective product, even though they did not
manufacture it.17 ' However, although causation may be weak in such
cases, it is still present.' Even though retailers, distributors, and wholesalers
are not the original cause of the defect,"' 2 they are still a cause of the plain-
tiff's harm since their failure to discover the defect and remove the product
from the stream of commerce resulted in the defective product reaching the
plaintiff.173 Even though there need not be a strong causal link between the
defendant and the plaintiff's harm, strict products liability still requires
some form of causation. 174
Causation is also important to strict products liability in that it serves as
some indication as to which entity should be held liable in order to further
the deterrence rationale. 175 The entities which cause people harm are most
likely to be the parties best able to respond to liability for injuries, because
such entities may take safety measures to eliminate any risk of causing
harm. Also, if the causation rationale supports the deterrence rationale in a
given case, then imposing liability on a manufacturer conforms with the
goal of justice in our tort system. 1 76 Causation is certainly an important
factor to consider when imposing products liability on an entity.
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 402A(1) (1965). For the specific wording
of Section 402A, see supra note 44.
171. For examples of cases where a retailer or distributor have been held liable even though
they did not manufacture the product, see Wilkinson v. Bay Shore Lumber Co., 182 Cal. App. 3d
594, 600-02, 227 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (1986) (strict liability for a defectively manufactured product
also applies to retailers, wholesalers, and distributors who sell that product); American White
Cross Laboratories, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 202 N.J. Super. 372, -, 495 A.2d 152, 155-56
(1985) (distributor and retailer strictly liable even if good is prepackaged and is merely passed
along to the consumer).
172. The original cause of the defect is generally the fault of the manufacturer because it
made the defective product.
173. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, -, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 899-900 (1964); see also American White Cross Laboratories, 202 N.J. Super. at -, 495 A.2d
at 155-56 (distributors and retailers are "merely conduits in the stream of commerce which ends
at the ultimate consumer").
174. See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, 463 F. Supp. 817, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) ("even in
product liability cases a manufacturer is responsible only for its own actions.").
175. See generally supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
176. For a brief discussion of justice as a difficult-to-define goal, see G. CALABRESI, supra
note 152, at 24-26.
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F. Analysis of the Representation Factor
The final rationale used to justify strict products liability is that the
manufacturer impliedly represents that a product is safe by placing it into
the stream of commerce, and that this representation is violated when a
product is defective.' 77 Whether a product is to be considered defective
often hinges upon the manufacturer's representations as to that product and
the expectations of a reasonable consumer or user."1 7Thus, it has been held
that strict products liability is not appropriate when there is no implied
representation of safety, such as when the defect is so obvious or so inherent
in the nature of the product that a reasonable person would not believe it to
be safe.'7 9 However, liability should not be denied just because there is no
breach of implied representation of safety since the manufacturer is often
the entity best able to implement some type of cost-efficient safety meas-
ures. '180 Hence, although the implied representation rationale often sup-
ports strict products liability, it is not always a necessary factor if liability in
a certain case is supported by the causation or deterrence rationales.'
VI. ANALYSIS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY RATIONALES AS
APPLIED TO THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Analysis of the Expanded Mere Continuation and
De Facto Merger Exceptions
The expansion of the mere continuation' 8 2 and de facto merger' 83 ex-
ceptions have led to imposing strict products liability on the successor cor-
177. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 402A comment g (1965) (a product is de-
fective when it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unrea-
sonably dangerous to him"); see, e.g., Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, -, 719
P.2d 1058, 1063 (1986); Taylor v. Gerry's Ridgewood, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 780, -, 490 N.E.2d
987, 991 (1986) (product is defective when it fails to perform in a manner reasonably to be ex-
pected); Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 42 Wash. App. 620, -, 712 P.2d 881, 885 (1986).
179. See, e.g., Smith v. Hub Mfg., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1505, 1508 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Nichols v.
Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Iowa 1985); Pettis v. Nalco Chem. Co., 150 Mich.
App. 294, -., 388 N.W.2d 343, 348 (1986); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc.
Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984).
180. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 305-16 (1977).
181. Conversely, note the idea that the manufacturer is the one best able to implement cost-
efficient safety measures is important to the causation and deterrence rationales. See generally
supra notes 156-76 and accompanying text. It would appear that the implied representation factor
by itself is not a sufficient justification for imposing strict products liability. See Twerski, supra
note 180, at 305-16.
182. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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poration even though there is no commonality or continuation of ownership
between the predecessor and the successor corporation. 184 This expansion
of not requiring commonality of ownership is not supported by the original
rationales behind the two exceptions when commonality was required,
namely: (1) successor liability in a de facto merger case is equitable because
continuity of shareholders means that the successor and predecessor corpo-
rations are "no longer strangers" because they have become one corpora-
tion, with the shareholders of the predecessor now shareholders of the
successor;185 and (2) successor liability in a mere continuation case is equi-
table because the presence of commonality of shareholders means that the
predecessor and the successor are really one entity with merely a name
change separating the two.' 86 Hence, shareholder continuity has been an
important factor for justifying successor liability before the expansion of the
exceptions because, with such commonality or continuity present, the suc-
cessor corporation is merely a changed outer shell of the predecessor. 187
The causation factor does not support successor liability if there is no
continuity of ownership. Without ownership continuity, the predecessor
and successor corporations are two distinct corporate entities. It is not the
successor that manufactured the defective product and participated in the
original chain of sale - it is the predecessor, an entity entirely distinct from
its successor.' 88 The causation rationale is not supported because, without
ownership continuity, it is the predecessor, not the successor, who causes
183. See supra notes 25-31.
184. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974).
185. Turner, 397 Mich. at _, 244 N.W.2d at 891-92; see also supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
186. Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391-93 (Iowa 1975); see also supra note
36 and accompanying text.
187. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that shareholder continuity is probably the most
important element in finding successor liability:
The shareholders are the ones who ultimately enjoy the profits and suffer the losses of the
corporation, and the shareholders of one corporation should not be able to move as a
group to another corporation, enjoy the continuing profits of the same business the corpo-
ration performed before merger, but escape all possible losses that accumulated before
merger.
Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, -, 433 N.E.2d
1104, 1110 (1982).
188. See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1982); Domine v. Fulton Iron
Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, -, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co.,
211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (1982); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1984); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 479 A.2d 126, 127
(1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 307, 376 N.W.2d 820, 827 (1985).
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the manufacture and sale of the defective product.18 9 Similarly, the implied
representation rationale is not supported without ownership continuity be-
cause the successor does not solicit the defective product, nor does it make
any type of representation as to the product's safety. 90
The deterrence rationale has little support for imposition of successor
liability in cases where there is no continuity of ownership. If the predeces-
sor in such cases is viewed as a distinct corporate entity, successor liability
results in charging a party other than the manufacturer of the good with the
costs of accidents caused by defective products.' This conflicts with the
fact that, even in cases where the manufacturer is not held liable, courts do
not search for another defendant to be held liable.' 92 Rather, the plaintiff's
claim must pass or fail against the original sellers or manufacturers of the
good. 1 93
The only support for successor liability in cases without stockholder
continuity is that if the successor knows it will be liable for defective prod-
ucts of its predecessor, the purchase price of the predecessor's assets reflects
this potential liability. Successor liability serves as a deterrent in such cases
because the predecessor has the incentive not to manufacture or sell defec-
tive products, so that the successor maximizes the value of its assets when it
decides to sell them.194 However, because liability would be imposed on the
successor without it being the cause of the defective product, 9 such liabil-
189. The district court in Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Tenn.
1978), had an interesting analysis as to why successor liability is inappropriate when there is no
continuity of ownership:
The corporate stranger which purchases some or all of the assets of a corporation bears no
closer relationship to a defective product produced by that predecessor than does any other
company in the industry which is producing the same product.... Thus, while the manu-
facturer is not "at fault" in the sense that it is negligent, it is held personally responsible for
the level of safety which it has selected. This responsibility cannot idly be cast upon a
stranger to the production process. Responsibility for production decisions should remain
with the party which made them. For this reason an entire industry is not held liable for
the defective products of one company. For the same reason, a simple purchaser of assets
should not be liable for the defective products of its predecessor.
Id. at 820-21; see also PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 42, sees. 97-102, at 690-712 (purpose of
strict liability has never been to expose manufacturers to liability for injuries with which they have
no connection).
190. See cases cited in note 189.
191. This fails the principle that the party manufacturing defective goods should be charged
with the costs of accidents caused by those products. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying
text.
192. See generally supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 157.
195. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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ity does not conform with the notions of tort justice.'96 The result is that
since neither the causation, the implied representation, nor the deterrence
rationales strongly support successor liability in cases where there is no con-
tinuity of ownership, liability should not be imposed under the expanded
continuation or the de facto merger exceptions.
B. Analysis of the Ray Product Line Exception
The product line exception of Ray v. Alad Corp. '97 ignores the business
aspects of the corporate acquisition by holding that a corporation which
"acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products ... assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same
product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from
which the previous business was acquired."' 98 By ignoring the corporate
aspects of successor liability'99 and concentrating instead on whether the
successor manufactures the same product line as its predecessor, the Ray
court developed a rule inconsistent with the major rationales of strict prod-
ucts liability. °°
First, the causation rationale does not support the Ray rule. The prod-
uct line rule imposes liability without analyzing how closely related the suc-
cessor and predecessor corporations are as to their entity structure, such as
commonality of shareholders, same management and officers, assumed lia-
bilities, etc.2 ' Ignoring these factors makes the product line rule similar to
the expanded continuation exceptions2 2 in that liability may be imposed on
the successor corporation even though it is an entity distinct from the pred-
ecessor.20 3  In cases under the product line rule, where there is no com-
monality of ownership between the predecessor and successor, successor
196. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
197. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
198. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
199. Examples of successor liability rules that look at the relatedness of the predecessor and
successor corporations include the de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of nonassumption of liabilities. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. These two
exceptions place heavy emphasis on stockholder continuity, a factor which the product line excep-
tion does not consider.
200. See supra notes 123-81 and accompanying text. The Ray court set out three justifica-
tions that it believed supported its rule. See supra text accompanying note 89. These justifications
generally have been attacked by many courts. See, e.g., cases cited in note 89. For a well-rea-
soned commentary attacking the Ray justifications, see Comment, Imposing Strict Liability Upon
a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of its Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alterna-
tives to the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1397, 1421-28 (1982).
201. See supra text accompanying note 89.
202. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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liability results in holding an entity liable which is not the cause of the
defective product because it is the predecessor, not the successor, who man-
ufactured and sold the defective product.2" The causation rationale does
not support the product line rule because the rule is too broad and might
impose liability in cases where the successor was not a cause of the defective
product. Similarly, the representation rationale often will support the prod-
uct line rule because the rule's overbreadth results in imposing liability
where, without stockholder continuity, it cannot be said that the successor
impliedly represented that the predecessor's products were safe.2°0
Second, the deterrence rationale provides little support for the product
line exception. It must be noted again that the product line exception in
some cases may impose liability on a successor corporation where there is
no continuity of ownership. 6 In such cases the successor is an entity dis-
tinct from the predecessor and, therefore, holding the successor liable will
result in charging the costs of accidents caused by defective products to a
party other than the manufacturer of the goods.20 7 This result conflicts
with the deterrence theory which seeks to charge the manufacturer, or any
corporate entity closely related to it in form, with its accident costs. In this
manner, the deterrence theory encourages the manufacturer to take safety
measures to improve its products in order to eliminate the risks of causing
harm.2 08
The Ray court's focus on continuation of the predecessor's product line
in order to deter a manufacturer from making unsafe products is similarly
not supported under the deterrence rationale. Successor liability is sup-
ported only if the successor's liability for its predecessor's defective prod-
ucts is somehow reduced due to improvements it makes in the predecessor's
defective product line. Without this type of extra incentive to make its prod-
ucts safer, the product line exception is unnecessary since a successor will
always have an incentive to improve its products, knowing it is liable for
injuries caused by any defective product it manufactures. The only benefi-
cial aspect of successor liability under the product line approach is that the
204. Id. For an interesting analysis of why successor liability is inappropriate in cases where
stockholder continuity is lacking, see the quote from Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F.
Supp. 817, 820-21 (E.D. Tenn 1978) set out in note 189.
205. The lack of ownership continuity is also the reason why the implied representation ra-
tionale does not support the expanded de facto and mere continuation exceptions. See supra note
190 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. This is also similar to the deficiency of




successor may receive more information about the defects in its predeces-
sor's products2 °9 and the costs of injuries caused by those defects due to
lawsuits being brought against it for its predecessor's products.2 10 How-
ever, whether the information the successor receives would dramatically in-
crease under product line liability is questionable because the successor
always has the incentive to seek such information in order to avoid liability
for its own defective products. It follows that the product line exception is
not necessary as an incentive to the successor to seek information necessary
to avoid liability for its own defective products, nor is it necessary to give
the successor incentive to improve the safety of its own product line.211
The only support for successor liability under the product line rule is
when the successor's knowledge that it will be held liable for the continued
production of its predecessor's line causes the purchase price of the prede-
cessor's assets to reflect this potential liability. The potential of such a low
sales price gives the predecessor the incentive not to manufacture defective
products in order to maximize its asset value. However, as under the analy-
sis of the expanded de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions, liabil-
ity would be imposed without the successor's fault; such liability offends the
notions of tort justice.212 Because neither the causation, the implied repre-
sentation, nor the deterrence rationale provide strong support for the Ray
product line rule, successor liability should not be imposed under that rule.
C. Analysis of the Successor's Duty to Warn
An emerging theory of successor liability is to impose on a successor
corporation a duty to warn owners of its predecessor's potentially defective
products, if two factors exist: (1) the successor knows or should know of
defects in its predecessor's products, and (2) some type of special relation-
ship exists between the successor corporation and the owners of products
manufactured by the successor's predecessor.2 13 Courts have been more
willing to find successor liability under a breach of duty to warn than under
209. This information will help the successor improve the safety of any particular product
line.
210. This information will help the successor decide whether it can cost-efficiently improve
the safety of any particular product line. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
211. For the same reasons, the rationale that the successor is in the best position to improve
upon the safety design of the predecessor's product is not a valid rationale to support successor
liability under the expanded de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions.
212. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the de facto merger and mere continuation
exceptions, see supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the elements
of the duty to warn. Note that it is essentially the special relationship between the successor
corporation and the product owner that creates this duty.
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the product line rule,2 14 the expanded de facto merger, and the mere contin-
uation exception.215 The main reason for this growing acceptance of the
successor's duty to warn is that the theory sanctions a successor corpora-
tion for breach of its own duty of care, rather than for its predecessor's
breach of a duty.216
The successor's duty to warn also has support from the rationales be-
hind strict products liability. The first rationale, causation, justifies succes-
sor liability even though the successor does not manufacture the defective
product. Its knowledge of the defect and its special relationship to the
owner of the product2 17 puts it in a position to rectify the risk of harm, or at
least warn about the product's defect.218 In cases where the plaintiff's harm
may have been prevented by a warning from the successor because of its
relationship to the plaintiff, it may be said that the successor's failure to
warn was a cause of the plaintiff's harm.2 9 Certainly, such causation is
stronger than that in the widely accepted cases where a distributor or a
retailer is held strictly liable.220
The deterrence rationale also supports successor liability under the duty
to warn theory. Although under this theory there is no deterrence against
the production of defective products,22' there is a deterrence against not
warning product owners of defects in their products, which ultimately re-
sults in safer products.222 The deterrence rationale also supports the duty
214. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text for a basic discussion of the product line
rule.
215. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text for a basic discussion of how two courts
have expanded the traditional exceptions to the corporate rule of nonassumption of liabilities.
216. The expanded traditional exceptions and the product line rule impose liability on a suc-
cessor corporation even though the successor was not necessarily a cause of either the product's
defectiveness or of the plaintiff's harm. See supra notes 188-90 & 201-05 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
218. Strict products liability seeks to hold a manufacturer liable only when it causes the in-
jury by manufacturing a defective product, or when it had some type of responsibility to rectify
the defect, which might include the duty to warn. See supra text accompanying note 169.
219. The successor was a cause of plaintiff's harm because the plaintiff might not have been
injured but for the failure to warn.
220. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. The causation factor is generally weak
when a distributor or retailer had no reason to know of the product's defect. The causation factor
is stronger in the duty to warn theory because in addition to the requirement of the successor
having actual or imputed knowledge of the defect, the successor must also have some special
relationship to the product owner. Hence, the successor is held liable under the duty to warn
theory only in cases where it clearly had the opportunity to prevent the plaintiff's harm by warn-
ing the product owner of the defects.
221. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text which explain that the deterrence ration-
ale seeks to prevent the manufacture of defective products.
222. This statement first assumes that it will be cheaper for successors to give warnings to the
product owners, rather than pay the costs of accidents caused by their predecessor's defective
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to warn theory in that if the successor has actual or implied knowledge of
the product's defect and has a special relationship to the plaintiff,223 then its
ability to give a direct warning to the product owner means that it is the
entity which can most effectively avoid the costs of accidents created by the
product.
The implied representation rationale supports liability under a duty to
warn only when there is a commonality or a continuity of identity between
the predecessor and successor, as in cases of a statutory merger or consoli-
dation, a de facto merger, or a mere continuation. 224 In such cases, the
successor is considered as being the predecessor in a changed form,225 and,
therefore, it can be said that the predecessor, now the successor, did im-
pliedly represent that the product was safe by placing it into the stream of
commerce. However, even though the implied representation rationale
might not justify successor liability in all cases under the duty to warn, it is
not an overriding factor resulting in denied liability, because the causation
and deterrence rationales so strongly support liability.226 Overall, the ratio-
nales behind strict products liability support imposing liability under the
duty to warn theory.
D. Analysis of the Bona Fide Purchaser Solution
Expansion of the bona fide purchaser (BFP) doctrine227 to successor lia-
bility issues results in holding a successor corporation liable for defective
products of its predecessor only if it knew or should have known of those
defective products. Under this rule, corporations may no longer manipu-
late the form of their corporate acquisitions in an attempt to avoid the pred-
ecessor's potential strict products liability.228 This may put a damper on
some corporate acquisitions. However, the rule is consistent with general
corporate law policies which seek to protect the successor corporations
from unknown liabilities in order to promote free alienability and stable
products. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. The second assumption is that the product
owners will have the incentive to heed the warnings about their defective products.
223. See supra text accompanying note 114 for the factors of this special relationship.
224. See supra note 12-14, 25-31, 32-36, and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 12-14, 25-36, 185-90 & 200-05 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 37-39 & 116-22 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 12-17 for the various types of corporate acquisition and their effect on
successor liability. Note that if the acquisition is by a cash purchase of the predecessor's assets,




predictability in corporate acquisitions, since under the rule there is liability
only for known liabilities.229
Successor liability under the BFP doctrine also has support from the
causation rationale of strict products liability. It is true that in many cases
the successor did not place the defective product into the stream of com-
merce.230 Yet, the successor's knowledge231 of defects in its predecessor's
products and knowledge that the predecessor would probably dissolve after
its asset sale232 may be said to be a cause in the plaintiff's inability to re-
cover from the predecessor. Although this is not the type of causation nor-
mally thought of in tort law,233 certainly it is not that much of a departure
from traditional causation in light of the fact that today's tort law often
imposes liability on distributors and retailers even though they had no rea-
son to know that products they purchased, and subsequently resold, were
defective.234
Successor liability under the BFP rule also finds some support under the
deterrence rationale. Although the purpose behind the deterrence rationale
is the prevention of the manufacture of defective products, under the BFP
theory the deterrence is the prevention of the manipulation of the structure
of an asset acquisition for the sole purpose of avoiding products liability
claims. This in turn guarantees that some protection is offered to future
products liability plaintiffs, because the successor will ensure that the prede-
cessor provides for potential products liability claims arising out of the
229. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
230. The successor should be considered as a cause only if there is a continuity or commonal-
ity of identity between the predecessor and the successor. See generally supra notes 13-3 6, 188-90
& 201-04 and accompanying text.
231. The knowledge may be actual or imputed.
232. Issues of successor liability generally arise because the predecessor is a corporation
which has dissolved and is no longer capable of being sued. See supra notes 7-11 and accompany-
ing text. However, in some cases the predecessor might not be a corporation, but rather a sole
proprietor who is still alive and can still be held liable for its defective products. See, e.g., Lemire
v. Garrard Drugs, 95 Mich. App. 520, 291 N.W.2d 103 (1980) (successor not liable because sole
proprietor was still alive); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
233. Generally, one thinks of cause as being a contributing factor to plaintiff's harm, not to
his inability to recover for that harm. See generally PROSSER ON ToRTs, supra note 42, sec. 41, at
263-68.
234. However, causation under the bona fide purchaser (BFP) rule is probably not as strong
as under the duty to warn theory, where, due to the successor's special relationship to the product
owner, it can be said that the successor's failure to warn is a cause of the plaintiff's harm. See id.
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predecessor's defects for which the successor may be held liable.235 Hence,
although the BFP rule does not directly deter the manufacture of defective
products, at least it deters conduct that results in a destruction of the claims
of future products liability plaintiffs.236 Successor liability may justly be
imposed under the BFP solution because it is supported by the causation
and deterrence rationales,23 although not as strongly supported as in the
duty to warn theory.238
VII. CONCLUSION
The products liability plaintiff seeking compensation from a successor
corporation for defective products sold by the predecessor corporation is
generally barred from recovery if the successor corporation acquired the
predecessor's assets through a cash purchase. Recent courts, recognizing
the conflict between products liability law and traditional corporate law,
have developed new rules to hold the successor liable for its predecessor's
defective products, even though the successor purchased the predecessor's
235. Assuming the successor uses ordinary care in its investigation into potential defects in its
predecessor's products, the successor will be liable only for defects it actually knows about. See
generally supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
The predecessor might provide for future claims by lowering the price of its assets to reflect
the future costs of product liability claims, by setting up a contingency fund which will pay for
future claims, or by purchasing insurance to cover the costs of future claims. These possible
solutions are often linked to other alternatives that are offered to solve the problems surrounding
successor liability. See, e.g., Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of
Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984) (offers various solutions, including
special insurance and allowing a bankruptcy-type court to handle the predecessor's asset sale so as
to provide for fair consideration in light of potential product liability); Comment, Imposing Strict
Liability Upon a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of its Corporate Predecessor:
Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1397 (1982) (offers
various solutions, including requiring the predecessor to obtain insurance to cover a period after
its dissolution); Comment, supra note 148, at - (promotes legislation to make products liability
insurance more easily attainable); see also Comment, The Inconsistencies and Confusion of Succes-
sor Corporation Liability in Product Liability Claims: Should Iowa Adopt a New Approach?, 34
DRAKE L. REV. 161, 191-94 (1984-85) (offers an interesting "comparative responsibility
approach").
236. Note that under the BFP rule the predecessor might be deterred from manufacturing
defective products knowing that the successor purchasing its assets will be liable for claims arising
out of known defects in the predecessor's products. Normally this type of deterrence is deemed
unjust unless the successor is a cause of the defect. See supra notes 194-96 & 212 and accompany-
ing text. However, it might be deemed fair under the BFP rule because the successor can be said
to be partially at fault. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
237. The analysis of the implied representation rationale as a justification for the BFP rule
would follow the analysis as it relates to the duty to warn theory. See supra notes 224-26 and
accompanying text. The analysis is not repeated here because the implied representation rationale
would only apply in certain cases, and because it is not too important of a rationale. See id.
238. See generally supra notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
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assets for cash. These rules, which include the expanded mere continua-
tion, expanded de facto merger and the Ray product line, are not supported
by the major rationales behind strict products liability, specifically, causa-
tion, deterrence and implied representation.239
Two new theories of successor liability are supported by the rationales
behind strict products liability: (1) the successor's duty to warn; and (2) the
bona fide purchaser (BFP) solution. These two new successor liability rules
satisfy the policies behind both corporate law and strict products liability
law. This means that the injured plaintif, as well as the defendant succes-
sor corporation, are more fairly treated. Courts faced with the issue of suc-
cessor liability should adopt either the duty to warn theory, which imposes
on the successor a duty to warn owners of its predecessor's products of
defects if a special relationship exists, or the BFP solution, which imposes
liability on the successor if it knew or should have known of its predeces-
sor's defective products. Adoption of either of these rules results in fair
treatment to all parties concerned, a result which has escaped most succes-
sor liability cases.
TIMOTHY J. MURPHY
239. These rules are also justified because the successor corporation allegedly profits from its
predecessor's goodwill. However, this justification is not sufficient for imposing successor liability.
See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
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